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Viktor Orbán’s political career was arguably spearheaded by a memorable speech 
delivered in Budapest’s Heroes’ Square on 16 June 1989. The then 26-year-old Orbán – a 
founding member of Fidesz (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége, the Alliance of Young Democrats) 
that was established in March 1988 – spoke on the occasion of the reburial of Imre Nagy and 
other martyrs of the 1956 Revolution. Re-reading or re-watching his 1989 speech (for a 
transcript in Hungarian see e.g. Magyar Nemzet, 16 June 2014) makes one acutely aware of the 
transformation that Hungary’s Prime Minister underwent since his youth as a liberal defiant of 
the governing Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party who demanded free elections and the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops and praised the virtues of European civic society. The change in 
Viktor Orbán’s ideological leanings and his open embrace of so-called illiberal democracy has 
been discussed extensively. In this article I outline key developments in media policy making 
between 2010 and 2018 as these are symptomatic of and at the same time play a crucial role in 
legitimizing Hungary’s shift to illiberalism. Hungary’s case represents a major challenge for 
those studying media and democracy as the recently introduced and implemented media policies 
depart from normative ideals associated with media in democratic societies yet their originators 
have been democratically elected with significant popular support and the laws have been passed 
following standard democratic legislative processes. Indeed, at the time of writing in April 2018 
Orbán secured another two-third majority victory in national elections and there are already signs 
that he and his newly formed government will continue on the illiberal path.   
Viktor Orbán first became Prime Minister of Hungary in 1998, his coalition government 
stayed in power till 2002. Following the 2010 parliamentary elections he took office again when 
the coalition of his party Fidesz and KDNP (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt, Christian 
Democratic People’s Party) gained a two-third majority (this has been referred to as 
supermajority and it is particularly important as with such a majority changes to the country’s 
constitution can be introduced). Developments in Hungary attracted international attention (and 
even alarm) following the Orbán government’s changes to media laws and to the Hungarian 
Constitution (re-named the Fundamental Law of Hungary) with some of these criticized as a as 
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departure from liberal democracy towards authoritarian rule. The European Commission (see e.g. 
EC 12 January 2012), the Council of Europe (see e.g. Venice Commission 20 June 2013) as well 
as a range of non-governmental organizations (see e.g. Human Rights Watch 18 September 
2013) have voiced strong concerns about the changes undermining the rule of law, judicial 
independence, the independence of the country’s Central Bank as well as restrictions on human 
rights. Orbán’s 2014 supermajority victory brought the continuation of criticized policies, 
moreover, their development has been paired with strong anti-European Union rhetoric.  
In July 2014 Viktor Orbán made a speech at the 25th Bálványos Free Summer University 
and Youth Camp1 in the Romanian Băile Tuşnad that has generated a lot of international interest. 
The Hungarian Prime Minister pointed out that western liberal democracy failed on a number of 
levels – the shortcomings were highlighted particularly following the 2008 financial crisis – and 
went on to state that Hungary needed to rebuild from scratch and the way in which to achieve the 
country’s renewal was to divert from the western liberal democratic model and instead build an 
illiberal nation state. “The most popular topic in thinking today is trying to understand how 
systems that are not Western, not liberal, not liberal democracies and perhaps not even 
democracies can nevertheless make their nations successful.” The non-liberal democracies that 
The Prime Minister referred to included Russia, China, Turkey, India and Singapore.2 
Fareed Zakaria – who coined the term illiberal democracy in 1997 – responded to the 
speech arguing that “Orbán has enacted and implemented in Hungary a version of what can best 
be described as ‘Putinism’ [whose] crucial elements … are nationalism, religion, social 
conservatism, state capitalism and government domination of the media. … Orbán has followed 
in Putin’s footsteps, eroding judicial independence, limiting individual rights, speaking in 
nationalist terms about ethnic Hungarians and muzzling the press” (Zakaria, 2014). In contrast to 
 
1 The Summer University was established in 1990 and runs annually since then. The original declared aim was to 
bring Hungarian and Transylvanian politicians together and maintain a dialogue across the Hungarian Romanian 
border.  Fidesz played a key role in establishing the University with prominent Fidesz politicians – including Orbán 
himself –   acting as regular speakers.  For more on the broader issue of diaspora politics in post-1989 Hungary see 
Waterbury 2006. 
2 For a Hungarian transcript of the speech see e.g. Farkas 2016; the official English translation is available at 
http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-
at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp 
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Zakaria’s conclusion, Buzogány (2017: 1309) argues that the shift towards “authoritarian great 
powers” was not based on ideational proximity with Vladimir Putin/Russia.  
 
Rather, it was preceded by growing alienation between the EU and Hungary that left little 
space for the Hungarian government to find other allies. Confronted with acute political 
criticism for its constitutional reforms by its Western allies, Hungary has increasingly 
become inclined to diversify its foreign policy. The economic crisis Hungary has faced 
since 2008 made the country’s opening towards Eastern interference a primarily 
economic interest-based strategy, helping to balance financial pressure from Western 
lenders. At the same time, while the Hungarian government provided rhetorical support 
for Russia in cases where its interests were at stake (energy issues, EU sanctions), it 
never left the common Western line but tried to increase its bargaining position on both 
sides (2017: 1309).   
 
Whether we share Zakaria’s or Buzogány’s standpoint or indeed agree with others 
writing on the topic (see e.g. Csillag and Szelényi 2015, Halmai 2014), there is no doubt about 
the intentional nature and impact of policies introduced by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s 
governments since 2010. Although – in the international context – changes at the national  level 
characterized by a “powerful tendency toward centralization, extending political control over 
state apparatuses and other sectors of society” (Hajnal and Rosta 2016: 10) received most 
attention in mainstream media, it is also Orbán’s sub-national governance reforms introduced 
between 2010 and 2014 that “fit in a new, broader, ‘illiberal’ tendency in Central and Eastern 
Europe” and represent an intentional manifestation of top-level political will (ibid.: 19).  Such a 
manifestation of political will from the highest echelons of leadership is also evident in the 
sphere of media and communications and it is crucial to keep the significance of such influence 
in mind as  
 
Media systems do not emerge spontaneously from the logic of communication 
technologies, or from the business plans of media corporations, or from the imaginations 
of creative individuals. … Media systems are instead purposefully created, their 
characters shaped by competing political interests that seek to inscribe their own values 
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and objectives on the possibilities facilitated by a complex combination of technological, 
economic and social factors (Freedman 2008: 1). 
 
A lot of the criticism of Hungary’s media laws introduced in 2010 has focussed on changes to 
public service media that seriously impacted on their independence from government, however, 
we should also keep in mind that government policies shape privately owned media, in Robert 
McChesney’s words “all media systems are the result of explicit government policies, subsidies, 
grants of rights and regulations. ... Indeed, to have anything close to competitive markets in 
media requires extensive government regulation in the form of ownership limits and myriad 
other policies” (2003: 126).  
Hungary’s case is a stark reminder that the political and judicial arenas play a key role in 
deciding about normative issues, in this case about how the media should operate if particular 
goals (promoting – or de-legitimizing – certain social values among them) are to be attained. 
Policy making is far from being a neutral, largely administrative and technical process, it 
involves a range of stakeholders who  
 
make claims within a political system on behalf of goals (favoured end-states) which are 
said, in the light of certain fundamental, or commonly held, values to be of general 
benefit to the whole society, community or public, over and above individual wants, 
satisfactions or utilities. These claims are specified in terms of preferences about a 
communication system or its performances which correspond to the advocated end-state 
(McQuail 1992: 27). 
 
Orbán’s supermajority governments have implemented media policies (as discussed further in 
this article) that are in contrast with long established ideals of media policy in democratic 
societies, in Ellen Goodman’s words such policy “consists of regulatory interventions 
specifically designed to promote communicative opportunities” (2007: 1211).  Such media 
policy can be characterized as universalistic, with the aim of ensuring the public interest in 
communication, “including the equality of access to the media for all. By contrast, some non-
consolidated democracies such as Hungary have engaged in particularistic media policies in an 
effort to enhance private interests. A primary means of the latter practices is the favouritist 
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distribution of media resources, as a result of which public assets are channelled into private 
pockets” (Bajomi Lázár  2017: 170-1).  In addition, there is another issue with media policy 
making in contemporary Hungary: although policy making is not a neutral process, in 
depoliticized settings it is informed by expert knowledge, however, as we see – perhaps in a 
magnified manner – with Hungary’s shift to illiberalism, “in politicized settings, research and 
expertise are much less likely to be used as an authoritative source of policymaking, as this could 
be interpreted as a threat to political primacy. When expertise itself becomes increasingly 
politicized, research–policy relations are more likely to vary over time with shifts in political 
power”3 (Scholten and Verbeek 2015: 189). 
Fareed Zakaria highlighted government control of the media as a characteristic of an 
“illiberal democracy.”  For those following developments in Hungarian media regulation and 
ownership and the government’s broader interventions in the field of media, the shift away from 
established liberal democratic practices has been evident for at least the past ten years. The long-
established democratic roles of media – the public sphere, the fourth estate, the watchdog etc. – 
have eroded in a number of so-called new democracies that emerged after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, however, this trend may be specially marked in the case of Hungary. Between 2010 and 
2018 Orbán’s governments developed a range of strategies and policy interventions that 
enhanced the government’s control of the media, the most widely discussed among these is the 
2010 Media Law4 that brought about changes seen as restrictive of media pluralism and freedom 
among others by the OSCE, Council of Europe as well as the European Parliament. Evidence of 
 
3 The broader issue of the questioning of expertise itself in relation to political decisions/policies is not restricted to 
Hungary, of course. The UK’s Brexit vote is a widely known example when politicians openly attacked expert 
knowledge. In the Hungarian government’s 2018 national election campaign investigative journalists, 
representatives of NGOs and academics were labelled mercenaries of the US financier and philanthropist George 
Soros, and in the aftermath of Viktor Orbán’s April 2018 victory, Figyelő, owned by an Orbán ally, published a list 
of individuals designated as such mercenaries, it is perhaps worth adding that the general public has been 
encouraged to supply further names for the list, see http://figyelo.hu/itt-a-vegleges-lista, for an article in English that 
explains the case see e.g. Gorondi 2018.   
4 Due to restrictions of space, I am leaving aside changes to the Hungarian constitution that prompted Guy 
Verhofstadt, the leader of the liberal ALDE group in the European Parliament to call for a suspension of Hungary’s 
voting rights (enabled by Article 7 and often understood as the EU’s nuclear option), see e.g. 
http://www.politics.hu/20120111/leader-of-liberals-in-europeanparliament-presses-for-sanctions-against-hungary 
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direct and indirect interventions in public service media has surfaced regularly since Orbán’s 
victory in 2010 and by 2017 Hungarian public service broadcasters effectively became the 
government’s propaganda tools. Many of the special roles that the normative ideal of public 
service broadcasting has been associated with in liberal democracies ‒ including the provision of 
impartial and balanced news, programming that represents a wide range of interests in society, 
contents that are deemed of high societal value etc. ‒ have been eroded or outright eliminated 
and the changes implemented in connection with the 2010 Media Law have centralized control 
over different aspects of public service media.     
 
Each of Hungary’s public service media outlets – three national TV, three radio stations 
and one national news service – are now supervised by a single body headed by a 
chairperson appointed by the Media Council. The assets of these outlets have been 
transferred to a newly established public media fund, which is managed by the Media 
Council. News content for all public media stations is produced centrally by Hungary's 
national news service, MTI, which is headed by a new director who was nominated by 
the Media Council chairperson. Opponents claim the measures have eliminated the 
independence of Hungary’s public service media, bringing all aspects – from 
programming to funding to regulatory supervision – under the Media Council’s control 
(Center for Media and Communication Studies 2011).  
 
Importantly, questions have been raised about the public service media’s independence – 
which “has been elevated to the status of a principle of European human rights law” (Venice 
Commission 19-20 June 2015: Paragraph 81). The Council of Europe’s Venice Commission 
concluded that the re-structured supervisory bodies potentially jeopardize the broadcasters’ 
independence: 
 
In sum, the Media Act does not secure pluralistic composition of the bodies supervising 
the PSM [public service media]; its provisions enable the ruling party/coalition to ensure 
the loyalty of the Media Council, of the MTVA [the cooperation of the four public 
service media organizations: Hungarian Radio (Magyar Rádió), Hungarian Television 
(Magyar Televízió), Duna Television (Duna Televízió) and Hungarian News Agency 
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(Magyar Távirati Iroda)] and of the BoT [Board of Trustees], and, through them, to 
control finances and personnel of the public broadcasters. This creates space for covert 
intrusion into the journalistic freedom in the public media sector – an intrusion which is 
not always possible to discern, because it does not manifest itself as formalised orders 
and sanctions, and which cannot therefore be prevented by means of judicial review 
(ibid.: paragraph 86). 5 
 
Similar concerns have been highlighted in a report by the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media 
Freedom on media pluralism in Europe, more precisely in 28 EU member states, and in two 
candidate countries – Montenegro and Turkey: 
 
… four are at high risk when it comes to political influences over different dimensions of 
their media operations – two of which are EU member states (Hungary and Slovenia), 
and two candidate countries (Montenegro and Turkey). Hungary is the only EU country 
that scores high risks for all five indicators in this area [the extent of the politicisation of 
the media system, media organizations, newsrooms, media reporting and the public 
service media], with most concerns being related to the allocation of state subsidies and 
advertising, and independence of PSM governance and funding (Brogi et al. 2017: 4).  
 
However, the impact of the new media policies was felt beyond public service media and 
in order to understand the broader context, Peter Bajomi Lázár’s concept of the party 
colonisation of media provides a fitting framework as the phenomenon    
 
 
5 A few concrete examples can be provided to highlight some of the issues involved: the Media Council has five 
members and is chaired by the President of the Media Authority who is appointed by the Prime Minister for 
indefinitely renewable 9-year terms. The other members of the Authority are nominated by an ad-hoc committee 
composed of delegates of each parliamentary faction. A particularly worrying issue ‒ in the context of Orbán’s 
supermajority – is that the votes of the members of the nominating committee are weighted according to the 
proportion of each faction’s representation in the Parliament. 
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may be defined as a strategy aimed at extracting from the media resources such as 
airtime, frequencies, positions and money, and channelling them to party loyalists in 
order to reward them for various services. It may target all media – public and private 
alike – but its primary targets are the regulatory authorities and public service 
broadcasters that parties may oversee more easily than private outlets, as the appointment 
mechanisms of their regulatory boards are designed in ways that enable them to delegate 
their supporters into these institutions (2013: 76, emphasis original).  
 
Bajomi Lázár goes on to outline objectives of party colonisation of media and these are all 
applicable to the case of Hungary: parties can call on constituents that they would not reach 
otherwise; the colonised media enable parties to gain new resources for indirect party funding; 
colonised media become pawns in party patronage; parties can use colonised media to exclude 
rival parties from participating in these (ibid.: 84).  
 I have already outlined some of the issues related to the colonisation of public service 
media, in the following section I highlight some policy interventions in the commercial media 
sector that contributed to the colonisation of these media by Fidesz. In the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis a number of foreign media owners left the Hungarian market and a radical re-
structuring of ownership occurred with oligarchs loyal to Viktor Orbán not only gaining 
ownership of some of the media but also guaranteed income from government advertising (a 
particularly important Orbán ally, Lajos Simicska, ran a media empire supporting Fidesz until 
the two parted ways in 20146; for an analysis of Simicska’s media empire see Bátorfy 2015).  
In the already mentioned report by the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission concern is 
expressed about the “disproportionate distribution of discretionary advertising revenue by the 
 
6 It has been argued that after the fallout, efforts were made to prevent Simicska from acquiring further media assets 
and “new” Orbán allies gained government backing for their media acquisitions. A major one involved Andy Vajna 
– Hollywood producer and since 2011 the Hungarian government’s representative (kormánybiztos) for  the film 
industry – who acquired the national commercial television channel TV2  after a legal battle with Simicska. It is 
perhaps worthwhile to mention here that Vajna secured the channel with a loan from state-owned Eximbank that 
was set up to support Hungarian exports and the government had to pass an amendment to a law to enable Vajna’s 
loan (see Byrne 2016 and also Czinkóczi 2017).      
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State”7 and also about restrictions on political advertising that impacted on the April 2014 
general elections and according to the OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission  “in 
the current media environment, the absence of other political advertisements on nationwide 
commercial television, combined with a significant amount of government advertisements, 
undermined the equal and unimpeded access of contestants to the media, which is at odds with 
paragraph 7.8 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document” (Venice Commission 19-20 June 
2015: paragraphs 93-99). 
Following Orbán’s landslide victory in 2014 the government also introduced (or 
proposed) changes that have had a serious impact on the funding of media, among these was the 
40% tax on advertising income (which disproportionately impacted on RTL Magyarország 
which forms part of the RTL Group) and the proposed tax on Internet services which was 
scrapped after large-scale protests. At the end of 2016 local and regional newspapers were also 
snapped up by those close to Orbán, “with the purchase of the local newspapers, it is estimated 
that some 90% of all media in Hungary is now directly or indirectly controlled by Fidesz. … The 
only independent media still standing in Hungary are a few outlets, including the investigative 
reporting operations Atlatszo and Direkt36 and the news server 444.hu. Their audiences pale in 
comparison with the Orbán-aligned media” (Dragomir, 2017, see also Reporters without Borders 
2017). More subtle ways of government interference involved, for example, the online news site 
vs.hu which received £1.5 million covert funding from the Hungarian Central Bank’s foundation 
(ten of its journalists resigned once the information about the funding surfaced but at the time of 
writing the website continued to function).   
The Hungarian government’s grip on media – public service as well as commercial ones 
– is playing out in political discourses in a manner that can only be characterized as propaganda. 
Indeed, Bajomi Lázár and Horváth (2013: 220) argue convincingly that “in contrast to the period 
1998–2010, the Peace Marches and other communication campaigns launched since Orbán’s 
government took office in 2010 have marked a paradigm shift in political communication, best 
described as the revival of old-school propaganda,” keeping in mind that “political propaganda is 
intended to establish ideological hegemony, while political marketing is based on the 
 
7 In 2017 12% of the overall television advertising revenue originated from the Hungarian government and 
importantly there has been an eightfold increase in the government’s television advertising spending between 2010 
and 2017 (Szalay 2018). 
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acknowledgement of ideological pluralism” (ibid, p. 222). As part of public communication 
campaigns (including election campaigns) certain types of – often Christian – nationalistic 
discourses8 have been promoted by the government, these tend to focus on the “nation’s 
enemies”, including refugees, NGOs, the EU and the Hungarian-born US financier George 
Soros. In the 2018 election campaign the use of hate speech as part of political communication 
has increased markedly, with the U.N. Human Rights Committee voicing concerns at “the 
prevalence (in Hungary) of hate crimes and about hate speech in political discourse, the media 
and on the Internet targeting minorities, notably, Roma, Muslim, migrants and refugees, 
including in the context of government-sponsored campaigns” (Nebehay 2018, see also Article 
19 2018). 
 The range of changes to Hungary’s media policies that were introduced between 2010 
and 2018 and indeed their impact have been varied and complex and in order to gain a fuller 
picture further scholarly work is needed not only on the area of media and communications but 
also on education and cultural policies as these will help capture the “temperature” of Hungary’s 
current state. None of the developments – whether in policy or in ownership or indeed in the 
distribution of advertising revenue by the government – are illegal yet their impact – as I have 
outlined above – is already eroding the democratic roles of media. As Bajomi Lázár concludes in 
relation to Hungarian particularistic media policy making,  
 
this practice is legal, by virtue of the current media regulation adopted by the same 
parliamentary majority that now enforces these measures. But not all that is legal is 
legitimate: the particularistic distribution of media resources is a form of institutionalised 
corruption and party patronage, and has had a devastating impact on some of the key 
components of democracy, including media freedom and pluralism, as well as the 
equality of access to the media (2017: 171). 
 
Also, as I suggested at the opening of this article, there are also issues with the current policy 
making process as such, the practice of using the government’s supermajority to introduce a 
 
8 The scope of this article does not allow me to discuss cultural and educational policies but these have also played 
an important role in the promotion of Christian nationalist values and discourses, see e.g. Bajomi Lázár and Horváth 
2013, Fekete 2016.   
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wide variety of policies is definitely of concern in terms of the health of Hungary’s democracy, 
the Venice Commission “objected to the use of cardinal laws for issues that, in the normal course 
of affairs, should have been left to ordinary legislation: ‘The more policy issues are transferred 
beyond the powers of simple majority, the less significance will future elections have and the 
more possibilities does a two-third majority have of cementing its political preferences and the 
country’s legal order’ ” (2015: paragraph 17).   
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